The Struggle for US Involvement

When the Somme Offensive came to its soggy and cold conclusion in November of 1916, German leaders were certainly considering the implications of US troops entering the war on the side of the Allies, as they had courted Mexico's involvement by first plotting (in true spy-like fashion) the return of General Huerta to Mexico to establish a pro-German regime, which had been foiled with his arrest in New Mexico in 1915, but a century ago actually sought permission to use a Mexican port for a U-boat base.

The Germans used spies in the US during #WW1 and, upon discovering the extent of Germany's blatant anti-American activities, such as the involvement of German embassy staff in the (failed) bombing of a bridge between Maine and New Brunswick and creating a $1,300,000 fund to be used to induce longshoremen and munitions workers to go out on strike, President Wilson's decided to publish the Secret Service's files to keep the American public duly informed of the dangers they faced.

In October 1916, U-53 stopped at Newport, Rhode Island and then sank five British and neutral ships just off American waters, all in accordance with prize rules, while American destroyers nearby rescued survivors. U-boats had been expanding their reach over the course of the war, even though their targets had been narrowed by politics.

The possibility of U-boat operations on the American side of the Atlantic having been proven, Germans began to investigate increasing their presence. They understood using American ports could be problematic, given their previous activities.

German strategists saw Mexico as a useful distraction should America enter the war. so, on 12 November 1916, the German ambassador to the United States cabled his counterpart in Mexico City, saying that “the Imperial Government [of Germany] would see with the greatest of pleasure the Mexican Government’s consent to…a [U-boat] base in its territory.”

According to Wikipedia, the Zimmermann Telegram (or Zimmermann Note) was an internal diplomatic communication issued from the German Foreign Office in January 1917 that proposed a military alliance between Germany and Mexico in the event of the United States' entering World War I against Germany.

The proposal was intercepted and decoded by British intelligence. Revelation of the contents enraged American public opinion, especially after the German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann publicly admitted the telegram was genuine on 3 March, and helped generate support for the United States declaration of war on Germany in April 1917.

The Struggle for Seven Miles on the Somme

The Battle of the Somme, conceived by Allied generals in 1915 to enable their amassed forces to break through the German lines from the outset, in fact lasted 141 days and was certainly one of the wars' bloodiest. It was a horrific battle fought along a 15-mile front that cost both sides over one million dead and wounded. Their efforts were officially halted in mid November a hundred years ago, sadly, without gaining much ground, having carried out the final battle on the River Ancre.

In early 1916, while also eagerly tunnelling underground and reporting on enemy positions and troop movements (as well as fighting) well overhead, the entrenched armies facing each other from across No Man's Land were being bombarded nightly and daily. Although the generals' original intention was to end this vicious stalemate, when the Germans attacked Verdun, the French found themselves desperate for a relief engagement and relied on the British and their Commonwealth armies to strike a hard blow and weaken the German Army.

When the massive combined offensive was launched, the British troops were enthusiastic patriotic volunteers yet poorly trained by commanders experienced in (for lack of better terminology) colonial warfare. Upon the battlefield today visitors will find the huge Memorial to the Missing of the Somme - and the names of 72,085 soldiers killed, blown to mist or buried in the mud of Northern France with no known grave.

Nearby, there is another memorial, an obelisk which commemorates the actions (and losses) of the 18th Eastern Division, whose men finally captured Thiepval in September - demonstrating successfully new tactics in doing so, which would prove invaluable to their renewed efforts in 1917. Initially, on 01 July, the 32nd Division's 96th Brigade were tasked to capture the "Spur" at Thiepval. In short, they were massacred within minutes of launching their assault.

By August, in response, the Germans were able to divert 42 divisions to the Somme.

As the battle progressed, recognising changes were needed in the field, certain commanders, such as British Major-General Maxse employed a creeping barrage, as well as launching the attacks of his 18th Division later in the day, rather than at dawn. Thus, when they achieved their objectives of capturing enemy trenches, machine-gun emplacements and numerous strongholds, remaining daylight would be minimised and soldiers would be able to take cover in the darkness. It was Maxse and his men, after three days of intense fighting, who took Thiepval.

A few months later, the now-popularised 'creeping barrage' was used at Ancre, for example, with great success while troops stormed the various heavily-fortified German positions and crossed the river. The 51st Highland Division eventually took Beaumont Hamel and the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division took Beaucourt and captured 7,000 German prisoners as winter set in.

The lessons that were learned at great cost during the Somme were duly analysed in the coming months by the British, who then issued two manuals in February 1917 and by April the Allies were a much more effective fighting force. However, over those 141 days, the Allies had advanced only seven miles and failed to break the defensive lines of the Germans (though indeed inflicting incredible casualties), who by March had retreated to the infamous  Hindenburg Line, as opposed to resuming fighting once again along the Somme.

The war was still, a century ago, two years away from being won.